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Measuring the Output and 
Prices of the Lottery Sector
An Application of Implicit 
Expected Utility Theory
Kam Yu
10.1    Introduction
This chapter studies the output and price measurement of the lottery sec-
tor using an economic approach. Perhaps as a result of the accumulating 
eﬀects in jackpots when there are no major prize winners in previous weeks, 
lottery industries in Canada and elsewhere are growing steadily. In 1997, 
according to the Survey of Household Spending (SHS), 68.4 percent of 
all households in Canada bought government-  run pool and lottery tickets, 
with the average expenditure per household equal to $238, which translates 
to 0.3 percent of total expenditures. Expenditure in gambling, however, has 
been found to be consistently underreported in the SHS. The actual amount 
of money spent on gambling, according to revenue reported by the govern-
ment, is three times the amount reported by households (Marshall 1998, 31). 
Therefore, the lottery industry has become a signiﬁ  cant part of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) and a more accurate method of measuring its 
output is needed. Moreover, prices in any game of chance are not currently 
included in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). If we are able to calculate the 
real output of a lottery, then an implicit price index can also be computed. 
This price index can be used both as a deﬂ  ator in the national accounts and 
as a subindex in the CPI.
In the theory of consumption under uncertainty, the typical consumer 
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is traditionally assumed to follow an optimal decision rule with risk-  averse 
preferences. This leads to the well- known expected utility hypothesis (EUH) 
in which the degree of risk averseness is often assumed to be decreasing in 
wealth. A wealthy person is more willing to invest in a risky but high- yielding 
portfolio than an average person. The EUH has been successfully applied 
to problems in insurance and ﬁ  nancial investment. Its linear structure, how-
ever, also implies that a risk- averse expected utility maximizer will never buy 
lottery tickets, unless the payout prizes are exceedingly large. In reality, we 
observe that consumers who are fully insured in their houses and cars also 
engage in a variety of gambling activities. Therefore, we need a diﬀerent 
approach other than the EUH. In the past two decades, new theories on eco-
nomic uncertainty have been developed. For example, Diewert (1995) shows 
that the real output of a simple gambling sector can be measured using 
implicit expected utility theory. This theory successfully models consumers’ 
risk averseness involving large portions of their wealth, and at the same 
time, it captures risk-  seeking gambling activities involving small amounts 
of money. In this chapter, Diewert’s model will be generalized from a simple 
two-  outcome lottery to an N-  outcome one (the 6/  49 lotto has six outcomes 
with diﬀerent payouts). The functional form of the estimating equation will 
be derived and estimated with Canadian data.
The portion of government output in the national accounts of industrial-
ized countries has been increasing over the past several decades. There has 
been an ongoing debate on the concept and practice of measuring govern-
ment output. Due to the absence of market prices in government services, 
statistical agencies traditionally use total factor costs as a proxy for the 
output. This practice has become less acceptable as the government sector 
has expanded. The Inter- Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts 
(1993)1 recommends that government output should be measured directly 
whenever possible. In fact, statistical bureaus in Australia, the United King-
dom, and the Netherlands have switched to various forms of direct methods 
recently. In the case of government lotteries, the price of a lottery ticket is 
not an appropriate price to measure the output of the lottery. In the absence 
of a suitable output price, government statisticians usually take lottery total 
factor cost as a proxy for the value of output and use the CPI to deﬂ  ate this 
value into a measure of real output. This chapter proposes a more satisfac-
tory direct method of measuring government services in lotteries. Our results 
show that by using a direct utility approach, the measured output of Lotto 
6/  49 in Canada is three times higher than the oﬃcial statistics. We also ﬁ  nd 
that the estimated price elasticity of demand is found to be very similar to 
those of other countries.
This chapter also addresses a question raised by Hulten (2001), who 
contrasted the consumer’s perspective in measuring output with the pro-
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ducer’s perspective. From the producer’s perspective, the lottery corpora-
tions simply provide a service to consumers to redistribute income after 
each draw.2 Therefore, output can be interpreted as the fee charged by the 
lottery corporations to provide the services. In this chapter, we take the view 
that for any services involving risk, the ex ante welfare of the consumers is 
more relevant. It seems if we do not take this point of view, the insurance 
and gambling industries are simply wasteful.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 10.2 examines the clas-
sical and new economic theories of uncertainty and some of their applica-
tions. In section 10.3, we brieﬂ  y discuss the gambling sector in Canada and 
apply the new theory to the economics of a lottery. A money- metric measure 
of the real output of the sector will be derived. In practice, a two- parameter 
equation is estimated using a nonlinear regression. The next step is to use the 
Canadian Lotto 6/  49 as an example to test the feasibility of the model. The 
results are presented in section 10.4. Finally, section 10.5 concludes.
10.2      The Economic Analysis of Risk: A Brief Review
10.2.1      The Expected Utility Hypothesis
The classical analysis of economic uncertainty begins with Friedman and 
Savage (1948) and Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953). Their writings 
form the basis for what is generally known as the expected utility hypothesis. 
The EUH has been successfully applied to a number of economic problems, 
such as asset pricing and insurance. It has also been used as the premise in 
statistical decision theory.3 In the basic model, the uncertainty is represented 
by a set of simple lotteries  over a set of outcomes . A simple lottery 
L   in the discrete case can be represented by a vector of outcomes and 
a vector of probabilities; that is, L   (p1, p2, . . . , pN), where Σ
N
i 1 pi   1. 
This notation means that outcome Ci   will occur with probability pi, i   
1, . . . , N. A consumer or a decision maker is assumed to have a complete 
and transitive preference structure  on . In addition, the preferences are 
supposed to be continuous and independent. The latter assumption means 
that for all L, L , L″   and 0       1, we have
L  L  if and only if  L   (1    )L″   L    (1    )L″.
Therefore, the ranking on L and L  remains unchanged if we mix the lotter-
ies with another one to form compound lotteries. Together, the continuity 
and independence assumptions imply the existence of an expected utility 
function U : → , such that
2. This perspective follows the treatment of insurance services from the viewpoint of a pro-
ducers’ approach to output measurement in risky industries.
3. See, for example, Luce and Raiﬀa (1957) and Pratt, Raiﬀa, and Schaifer (1995).408    Kam Yu




where ui, i   1, . . . , N are utility numbers assigned to the outcomes Ci  , 
respectively. Therefore,
L  L  if and only if U(L)   U(L ).
The independence assumption, which gives rise to the linear structure of 
the expected utility function, has been controversial from the beginning. 
Samuelson (1952) defends the independence axiom by arguing that in a sto-
chastic situation, the outcomes Ci are mutually exclusive and therefore are 
statistically independent. Consequently, U(L) must be additive in structure. 
Moreover, using a theorem by Gorman (1968), Blackorby, Davidson, and 
Donaldson (1977) show that continuity and independence imply that the 
utility structure under uncertainty is additively separable.
In spite of its solid theoretical foundation and normative implications, 
some applications of the EUH do not conform well with real behavior.4 The 
most serious challenge is the Allais (1953) paradox, which can be illustrated 
by the following example. It involves decisions over two pairs of lotteries. 
The outcomes are cash prizes (C1, C2, C3)   ($2,500,000; $500,000; 0). In 
the ﬁ  rst pair, the subjects are asked to choose between L1   (0, 1, 0) and 
L  1   (0.10, 0.89, 0.01). That is, L1 is getting $500,000 for sure, while L  1 has 
a 10 percent chance of winning $2,500,000, an 89 percent chance of win-
ning $500,000, and a 1 percent chance of winning nothing. The second part 
involves choosing between L2   (0, 0.11, 0.89) and L  2   (0.10, 0, 0.90). 
Allais claims that most people choose L1 and L  2. This contradicts the EUH, 
because if we denote u25, u05, and u0 to be the utility numbers that correspond 
to the three prizes, then L1  L2 means that
u05   0.1u25   0.89u05   0.01u0.
Adding 0.89u0 –   0.89u05 to both sides of the above inequality gives
0.11u05   0.89u0   0.1u25   0.9u0.
This implies people should choose L  1 instead of L  2.
The linear structure of the EUH also implies that a risk-  averse consumer 
will never gamble, even for a fair game, no matter what the degree of risk 
aversion the consumer has.5 Friedman and Savage (1948) try to correct this 
problem by proposing a utility function u with concavity varying with wealth 
level. This ad hoc ﬁ  x does not solve the problem for small gambles, because 
both the normal wealth level and the payout prizes are far out in the concave 
4. See, for example, Machina (1982), Rabin (2000), and Rabin and Thaler (2001).
5. See Diewert (1993, 425). Rabin and Thaler (2001) provide numerical illustrations on 
the absurdity of some implications of the EUH. Also see comments by Watt (2002) and the 
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section of u, given the insurance-  buying behavior of the typical consumer. 
Cox and Sadiraj (2001) propose a new expected utility of income and initial 
wealth model, which assumes that the outcomes are ordered pairs of initial 
wealth and income (prize). Their model may have applications in other areas, 
but they concede that “the empirical failure of lottery payoﬀs is a failure of 
expected utility theory” (16). The EUH may be a good theory in prescribing 
how people should behave, but it fails as a model to describe how people 
actually behave. Therefore, in order to model a small gamble like the Lotto 
6/  49, we need a preferences structure that is more ﬂ  exible than the EUH.
10.2.2    Nonexpected  Utility  Theories
Most of the theories developed to resolve the Allais paradox involve 
replacing or relaxing the independence axiom.6 For example, by taking a 
general approach to the idea of a mean function, Chew (1983) replaces the 
independence axiom with the betweenness axiom. Instead of discrete proba-
bilities on events in , let  now denote the set of probability distribution 
functions. The betweenness axiom assumes that for all F and G in , F  
G requires that
(2)   F   (1    )G  F,  0        1,
where F  G means F  G and G  F; that is, the consumer is indiﬀerent be-
tween the lotteries F and G. This means that if a consumer is indiﬀerent 
between lotteries F and G, then every convex combination of F and G is 
indiﬀerent to them as well. As a consequence, the indiﬀerence curves are 
still straight lines. The independence axiom in EUH, on the other hand, can 
be characterized as
(3)  F  G ⇒  F   (1    )H   G   (1    )H,  0        1,
for any H  . We can see that equation (3) reduces to equation (2) if 
H   F. The involvement of a third lottery H in equation (3) implies that 
the indiﬀerence curves are parallel straight lines. This additional restriction 
gives rise to the Allais paradox. The betweenness axiom together with other 
regularity conditions imply that preferences can be represented by a general 
mean function M :  → , such that7
(4)  M(F)     1  
∫  dF
 
∫ dF  ,
where   is a strictly monotonic and increasing function, and   is a continu-
ous and nonvanishing function, both on the domain of F. In equation (4), 
  is similar to the Von Neumann-  Morgenstern utility function u in equa-
6. For surveys of the nonexpected utility theories, see Epstein (1992), Machina (1997), and 
Starmer (2000).
7. For details, see Chew (1983), Dekel (1986), and Epstein (1992).410    Kam Yu
tion (1), while   is an additional weighting function. The mean function M 
can be interpreted as the certainty equivalent of F.8 This two-  parameter 
generalization of the EUH is less restrictive and can be used to resolve the 
Allais paradox.
Other developments in nonexpected utility theory include, for example, 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, Gul’s (1991) theory of dis-
appointment aversion, and the rank- dependent utility theory.9 In Gul’s anal-
ysis, for example, a lottery is decomposed into an elation component and a 
disappointment component. A weak independence axiom is deﬁ  ned in terms 
of the elation/ disappointment decompositions of lotteries. The combination 
of disappointment aversion and a convex Von Neumann-  Morgenstein util-
ity function may represent preferences that are risk averse to even chance 
gamblers and gamblers facing large losses with small probabilities, but also 
to risk- loving gamblers facing large prizes with small probabilities. Basically, 
this provides the fanning out eﬀect to avoid the Allais paradox (Machina 
1997).
Using the contingent commodity approach of Arrow (1964) and Debreu 




pi u(xi)    u(u)   0,
where   : 2 →  is function of the utility u and xi. In this formulation, xi   
f(yi), where yi is a choice vector in the state of nature i, i   1, . . . , N, and f 
is the consumer’s certainty utility function.10 The function u   F(y1, y2, . . . , 
yN) is the consumer’s overall state-  contingent preference function. Notice 
that u is implicitly a solution of equation (5). For aggregation purposes, if 







  u     (1)   0,
where   is an increasing and continuous function of one variable.
A common property of nonexpected utility theories is that they can rep-
resent consumers with ﬁ  rst-  order risk aversion, which implies that the risk 
premium of a small gamble is proportional to the standard deviation of the 
gamble.11 For a consumer with an expected utility function, on the other 
hand, second-  order risk aversion is exhibited, where the risk premium is 
8. In the context of equation (1), the certainty equivalent  (L) of lottery L is deﬁ  ned as 
u[ (L)]   U(L). For a risk-  averse decision maker, the risk premium of L is the diﬀerence 
between the expected value of L and  (L).
9. See, for example, Yaari (1987), Chew and Epstein (1989a), Quiggin (1993), and Diecidue 
and Wakker (2001).
10. The function f is the counterpart of the Von Neumann-  Morgenstein utility function.
11. See Segal and Spivak (1990) and Epstein (1992).Measuring the Output and Prices of the Lottery Sector    4 1 1
proportional to the variance of the gamble. The diﬀerence can be illus-
trated graphically for the case N   2. In ﬁ  gure 10.1, x1 and x2 represent 
the monetary outcome of states of nature 1 and nature 2, respectively. We 
assume that p1   p2   1/  2, so the indiﬀerence curves are symmetric about 
the forty-  ﬁ  ve degree certainty line. First-  order risk aversion is represented 
on the left with a kink at the certainty line, whereas second-  order aversion 
is represented by the smooth indiﬀerence curve on the right.12 At the lower 
indiﬀerence curve, the kink implies a lot of risk aversion, and the consumer 
would not want to gamble for low levels of income (and will be willing to 
pay a premium for insurance). At the higher indiﬀerence curve, there is now 
a willingness to engage in small gambles (and the premium the consumer is 
willing to pay for insurance is now less). Extensive discussion on this point 
can be found in Diewert (1993).
Intuitively, both standard derivation and variance are statistical measures 
of spread of the distribution. In other words, they measure how far the 
random variable is away from the mean over the whole distribution. The 
standard derivation is conceptually equivalent to measuring the absolute 
distance between the variable and the mean, |x –    |, while the variance is 
equivalent to measuring the square of distance, (x –    )2. This explains the 
kinks for the ﬁ  rst-  order risk aversion and the smoothness in the second-
  order risk aversion.
10.2.3      Applications of the New Theories
The EUH has been applied to many areas in economics involving uncer-
tainty. Because observed behavior and experimental results sometimes 
contradict the theory, it is interesting to see whether the nonexpected util-
ity theories can be successfully applied to those areas. In this section, we 
Fig. 10.1  First-   and second-  order risk aversion
12. Machina (2001) provides a detailed discussion of kinks on an indiﬀerence curve.412    Kam Yu
review some applications of the newly developed theory to intertemporal 
consumption analysis, asset pricing, and output analysis in insurance and 
gambling.
Chew and Epstein (1989b) ﬁ  rst extend the implicit expected utility to an 
axiomatic analysis of a two-  period intertemporal preferences. They ﬁ  nd 
that in order for the new theory to be admissible, one of the two axioms 
(consistency and timing indiﬀerence, which imply the EUH) has to be 
relaxed. The application is later extended to the case of multiple-  period 
consumption-  saving decision with a recursive structure (Chew and Epstein 
1990; Epstein 1992). In traditional consumption-  saving analysis, the use of 
a one- parameter utility function cannot separate intertemporal substitution 
and the degree of risk aversion. For example, a typical intertemporal utility 
function is





f(c)    
c1  /(1    ),
log c
  
0      1
    1,
where ct is the consumption expenditure in period t, t   0, 1, . . . ,  ; p is 
the probability measure of the future (uncertain) consumption vector 
(c1, c2, . . .); and    (0, 1) is the discount factor. Here,   serves both as a 
relative risk- aversion parameter and the reciprocal of the elasticity of substi-
tution. By modifying the recursivity axiom, Chew and Epstein (1990) show 
that the two concepts can be untangled by a class of utility functions that 
exhibits ﬁ  rst-  order risk aversion; for example, the one suggested by Yaari 
(1987, 113).13 If the recursivity axiom is not assumed, however, then prefer-
ences may be inconsistent; that is, a consumption plan formulated at t   0 
may not be pursued in subsequent periods. The situation can be modeled as 
a noncooperative game between the decision maker at diﬀerent times, and 
a perfect Nash equilibrium is taken to describe the behavior.
Using a similar approach, Epstein and Zin (1989) develop a generalized 
intertemporal capital asset-  pricing model (CAPM). This model is used to 
study the equity premium puzzle in the United States, which has a historical 
average value of 6.2 percent. Using calibration of preferences by simulation 
technique, empirical results by Epstein and Zin (1990) show that the use 
of nonexpected utility function can explain at least a part (2 percent) of 
the equity premium. Epstein and Zin (1991) also apply the intertemporal 
CAPM to update the permanent income hypothesis of Hall (1978). In this 
study, the utility function takes the form
13. The recursivity axiom assumes that the recursive preference structure of a consumer is 
consistent over time and across states of the world. See Chew and Epstein (1990, 62–  63) for 
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U ˜
t   W[ct,  (Ut 1|It)],
where   is the certainty equivalent of the recursive utility U ˜
t 1 at period 
t   1, given the information It in period t. The separation of intertemporal 
substitution and risk aversion makes the model more realistic. The resulting 
estimating equation is the weighted sum of two factors: a relation between 
consumption growth and asset return (intertemporal CAPM) and a relation 
between the risk of a particular asset and the return of the market portfo-
lio (static CAPM). They conclude that the expected utility hypothesis is 
rejected, but the performance of the nonexpected utility model is sensitive to 
the choice of the consumption measure (nondurable goods, durable goods, 
services, etc.). Average elasticity of substitution is less than one, and average 
relative risk aversion is close to one.
Using the implicit utility function as described in equation (5), Diewert 
(1993, 1995) outlines simple models for measuring the real outputs of the 
insurance and gambling sectors. Here, we describe the model of a two-  state 
lottery game. This simple model will be extended in the next section into a 
six-  state lottery. The two-  state lottery is L   (p1, p2), with p2   1 –   p1. The 
corresponding outcomes are
(7)  x1   y   w,  x2   y   Rw,
where y is the consumer’s income, w is the wager, and R is the payout ratio. 
Assuming homothetic preferences, the implicit utility function  u can be 
written as   in equation (6):




In order to provide a kink in the indiﬀerence curve, we employ the following 
functional form for  :
(8)   (z)    
    (1    )z ,
1        z ,
  
z   1
z   1,
where 0       1/  2,     1,     0. The implicit expected utility in equation 
(5) for this game is
(9)  p1 u(x1)   p2 u(x2)    u(u)   0.
Substituting   in equation (8) into equation (9) as  u, we have for x1   x2,
(10)  u   [ x1
    (1    )x2
 ]1/ ,
where     p1 / [p1   (1 –  p1)(1 –   )]. Putting equation (7) into equation (10), 




  +(1− )(y+Rw)
 ]
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where 0   w   y. The ﬁ  rst-  order condition is
 
y   Rw∗
 
y   w∗     




1 (1  )
     
(1   p1)(1    )R
  
p1   
1 (1  )
    b.
Solving for the optimal w∗, we have
w∗   
y(b   1)
 
b   R
.
Because y, R, and w∗ are observable, we can calculate b in each period. Then, 
  and   can be estimated with a regression model. Having estimated   and 
 , we can calculate the consumer’s utility level without gambling:
u0   [ y    (1    )y ]1     y.
Similarly, the utility level with gambling is
u∗   [ (y   w)    (1    )(y   Rw) ]1/ .
The real output of the gambling service is then
Q   u∗   u0.
10.3      Modeling the Gambling Sector
10.3.1      Gambling Sectors in Canada
The gambling industry in Canada has been growing in size and in revenue 
over the last decade. For example, revenue increased from $2.7 billion in 
1992 to $7.4 billion in 1998, while employment grew from 11,900 in 1992 to 
39,200 in 1999. In 1992, government lotteries were the major component in 
all games of chances, representing 90 percent of all gambling returns. They 
peaked at $2.8 billion and have been declining at a moderate rate. On the 
other hand, video lottery terminals (VLTs) and casinos have grown rapidly. 
In 1998, revenue from the latter has overtaken government lotteries as the 
dominant player (Marshall 2000).
Government lotteries are administered by ﬁ  ve regional crown corpora-
tions: namely, Atlantic Lottery Corporation, Loto-  Québec, Ontario Lot-
tery and Gaming Corporation, Western Canada Lottery Corporation, and 
British Columbia Lottery Corporation. Most of these corporations oﬀer 
their own local lottery games. The national games, Lotto 6/  49, Celebration 
(a special event lottery), and Super 7, however, are shared by all the corpo-
rations through the coordination of the Canadian Interprovincial Lottery 
Corporation, which was established in 1976 to operate joint lottery games Measuring the Output and Prices of the Lottery Sector    4 1 5
across Canada. Lotto 6/  49 games are held twice a week on Wednesday and 
Saturday. Forty- ﬁ  ve percent of the sales revenue goes to the prize fund. The 
ﬁ  fth prize, which requires matching three numbers out of the six drawn, has 
a ﬁ  xed prize of ten dollars. The prize fund, after subtracting the payout for 
all the ﬁ  fth prizes, becomes the pool fund. This pool fund is divided among 
the other prizes by ﬁ  xed shares, as shown in table 10.1. The prize money is 
shared equally among the winners of a particular prize category. If there is 
no winner for the jackpot, the prize money will be accumulated (rollover) 
to the prize fund of the next draw. About 13.3 percent of the sales revenue 
is used as the administration and retailing costs. This portion is used by 
Statistics Canada as the output of the Lotto 6/  49 game in the GDP. As a 
consequence, the lottery corporation retains 41.7 percent (55 percent minus 
13.3 percent) of the revenue as proﬁ  t. This proﬁ  t margin can be regarded 
as a tax on the output of the lottery sector. Thus from the ﬁ  nal demand 
perspective, the value of lottery output should be listed as 55 percent of the 
sales volume, which is about four times the value from the industry accounts 
perspective (13.3 percent).
10.3.2      The Output of Government Lotteries
In this section, we extend Diewert’s (1995) simple model to the measure-
ment problem of a common lottery sector. A typical game of lottery—for 
example, Lotto 6/ 49 in Canada—involves choosing six numbers out of forty-
  nine. Five prizes are awarded, according to the rules listed in table 10.1.14
For example, the probability of winning the jackpot for one single ticket 
is 1/  C6
49   1/  13,983,816   0.0000000715—a one in 14 million chance. The 
probability of the second prize is six times the probability of the jackpot; 
that is, 6/  13,983,816   0.000000429, and so on.15 The following notation is 
used in the model: w   wager; pi   probability of winning the ith prize, i   
1, . . . , 5; p6   probability of not winning any prize; xi   state-  contingent 
consumption, i   1, . . . , 6; y   real disposable income; and Ri   payout for 
the ith prize, i   1, . . . , 6.
Buying more than one ticket increases the chance of winning. Therefore,
Table 10.1  Prizes of Canadian Lotto 6/49
Prize   Rule   Probability of winning,  i  
Share of the 
pool fund
Jackpot 6 numbers 0.0000000715 50%
Second 5 numbers   bonus 0.000000429 15%
Third 5 numbers 0.00001802 12%
Fourth 4 numbers 0.0009686 23%
Fifth   3 numbers   0.01765   $10
14. See Ziemba (1986).
15. For details of computing all the probabilities, see Hoppe (1996).416    Kam Yu
(11)  pi   w i,  i   1, . . . , 5,
where  i is the probability of winning the ith prize for one single ticket. 
Also, we have
(12)  p6   1   
i=1
5





(13)  xi   y   Ri   w,  i   1, . . . , 6.
We assume a representative consumer with homothetic preferences, so his or 
her state-  contingent preference function u   F(x1, . . . , x6, p1, . . . , p6) can 
be deﬁ  ned implicitly using equation (6). Using the kinked functional form 




pi     (1    ) 
xi  
u 
     p6 1         
x6  
u 
     1   0.
Solving for u and using equations (11), (12), and (13), we have
(14)  u(w)    
(1    )wΣ
5
i 1 i(y   Ri   w)     (1   wΣ
5
i 1 i)(y   w) 
      
    (1   2 )wΣ
5
i 1 i  
1  
.
The consumer’s utility maximization problem is to maximize u(w), subject 
to the constraint 0   w   y. For notational convenience, we deﬁ  ne the fol-
lowing variables as
(15)  d   y   w,
 p    
i=1
5 ∑  i,
 q    
i=1
5 ∑  i(y   Ri   w)  1, and
 r    
i=1
5 ∑  i(y   Ri   w) .
The ﬁ  rst-  order condition for the utility maximization problem (assuming 
that a boundary solution does not occur) can be written as
 (1    )r    q(1    )[    (1  2 )wp]w 
    (1   wp)[    (1   2 )wp]d  1    (1    )pd    0.
Rearranging terms, we get a quadratic equation in w:
{ p[ (1   2 )pd  1   (1    )(1   2 )2q]}w2 
  {  [ pd  1   (1    )q   (1   2 )pd  1]}w 
   [(1    )r     d  1   (1    )pd ]   0.
Solving for this quadratic equation gives us the following equation involving 
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(16)  w∗   [   [ pd  1   (1    )q   (1   2 )pd  1]
    ({  [ pd  1   (1    )q   (1   2 )pd  1]}2
    4 [(1    )r     d  1   (1    )pd ]
 {  p[ (1   2 )pd  1   (1    )(1   2 )q]})1/2]
    2{ p[ (1   2 )pd  1   (1    )(1   2 )q]}.
Equation (16) is the estimation equation for the parameters   and  , given 
the data for the other variables. Notice that w appears in the right- hand side 
of equation (16) through the variables d, q, and r, which were deﬁ  ned in 
equation (15). But the eﬀects of w on d, q, and r are negligible, because the 
disposable income y and the sum of y and the payout prizes Ri are so much 
larger than w, and hence we can simply set w equal to zero in those deﬁ  ni-
tions. Another functional form, the kinked quadratic-  generating function,
   (z)    
z    (z   1)    (z   1)2,
z,
  
z   1
z   1,
was attempted in addition to equation (8), but the analysis yielded no explicit 
solution for w.
The output of services provided by Lotto 6/  49 is equal to the diﬀerence 
between utility level with the lotteries and utility without the lottery using 
equation (14); that is,
(17)  Qt   u(wt)   u(0),
where wt is the observed wager in period t. An implicit price level can also 
be obtained as
(18)  Pt   
(1    )wt
  
Qt ,
where   is the proportion of the prize fund from the total revenue. In the case 
of Lotto 6/  49,     0.45. The approach here follows the ﬁ  nal demand per-
spective discussed in section 10.3.1. The resulting price index is an implicit 
cost-  of-  living index and can be included as a subindex in the CPI.
10.4      Estimating the Output of Government Lotteries
10.4.1    Data
Data on the winning numbers, payout prizes, and sales volume provided 
by Lottery Canada are available from November 11, 1997, to November 3, 
2001, for Lotto 6/  49, a total of 419 draws. Monthly data on the CPI and 
annual data on the number of households, personal disposable income, and 
participation rates in government lotteries are available from Statistics Can-
ada. The sales volume of each draw is divided by the number of participating 
households, which gives the average wager per participating household, wt. 418    Kam Yu
The average personal disposable income per household, adjusted by the CPI, 
is used as a proxy for yt.
Figure 10.2 depicts the number of ticket sales for the sample period. 
We see that there is a downward trend in sales, reﬂ  ecting the switch from 
government lotteries to other games, such as VLTs and casinos. Table 10.2 
summarizes the average sales, number of winners, and the payout prizes of 
the observed draws. The biggest jackpot during the sample period was $15 
million, won by a single ticket on September 30, 2000. In table 10.2, we also 
calculate the expected average number of winners using the probabilities in 
table 10.1. We see that in each prize, the observed average number of win-
ners is slightly smaller than the expected number. One possible explanation 
of the diﬀerence is that some players pay more than one dollar for the same 
numbers, which often happens in lottery pools. Of the 419 draws, 151 end up 
with a rollover, which is 36 percent. Given that the expected number of jack-
pot winners is 1.2 on average, this rollover percentage seems high. In fact, 
this agrees with previous observations in Canada (Ziemba 1986; Stern and 
Cover 1989), the United States (Chernoﬀ 1981), and the United Kingdom 
Fig. 10.2  Monthly sales of Lotto 6/  49: November 1997 to November 2001
Table 10.2  Descriptive statistics of Canadian Lotto 6/49: November 11, 1997, to 
March 11, 2001
    Sales   Jackpot   Second   Third   Fourth   Fifth
Average number of winners 16,717,385 1.12 7.13 299 16,036 292,604
Expected number of winners 1.20 7.17 308 16,199 293,287
Prize ($)       3,249,108  133,903  1,976   68   10Measuring the Output and Prices of the Lottery Sector    4 1 9
(Walker 1998; Simon 1999) that people have “conscious selection” (Cook 
and Clotfelter 1993); that is, some numbers on average are more popular 
than the others.16 For example, the six most popular numbers of Lotto 6/  49 
in Canada were 3, 5, 6, 9, 12, and 13 in 1986. One possible reason is that a 
lot of people use their birthdays as their choices. Therefore, numbers starting 
from thirty-  two onward are among the most unpopular numbers.
A lot of attention is concentrated on the jackpot prizes, particularly when 
there are rollovers and the pool fund becomes very big. Figure 10.3, however, 
shows that the average expected value is highest for the smallest prize. In the 
ﬁ  gure, EV1 to EV5 are the products of the payout prized and their respective 
probability of winning from March 4 to June 17, 1998. Because the payout 
is ﬁ  xed at ten dollars, EV5 is constant. In only one draw is EV2 higher than 
EV5, and EV1 is higher than EV5 in several occasions. The ﬁ  fth prize has 
a high expected value because of the relatively high probability of winning. 
The pleasure and thrill from buying a lottery ticket, nevertheless, comes from 
buying the big jackpot ticket, which has an extremely low probability of 
winning. This is why a nonlinear expected utility theory is needed to capture 
the risk-  loving side of consumers.
10.4.2    Estimation  and  Results
The parameters   and   in equation (16) are estimated by a nonlinear 
regression equation using the maximum likelihood method. Theoretically, 
16. For a general discussion, see also Haigh (1997).
Fig. 10.3  Expected values of the various prizes420    Kam Yu
demand depends on the expected values of the payout prizes R1, . . . , R4, 
which in turn depend on the sales volume. The actual payout prizes, how-
ever, are used in the estimation. Following Walker (1998, 371), we invoke 
the rational expectations assumption, which implies that consumers do not 
make systematic mistakes in forecasting the sales. Figure 10.4 is a scatter 
plot of the sales volume against the ex post expected value of a ticket. It 
clearly shows the positive relation between the two. The estimated values of 
  and   are 0.10458 and –  31.986, with standard errors equal to 0.003165 
and 5.9527, respectively, which implies t- ratios of 33 and – 5.4. The estimated 
values satisfy the constraints 0       1/ 2,     1,     0 in equation (8). These 
estimated values are then used to calculate the money-  metric utility u(wt) 
and the output level Qt of the lottery using equations (14) and (17), respec-
tively, for each draw. Outputs are aggregated into monthly results before the 
implicit price Pt is calculated using equation (18). A ﬁ  xed- base price index is 
then calculated using the price level of November 1997 as the base.
Figures 10.5 and 10.6 show the monthly price index and output of the 
Lotto 6/  49 using this procedure. In ﬁ  gure 10.6, the factor cost (13.3 percent 
of sales revenue) is also included for comparison. Notice that the estimated 
output using the economic approach is much higher than the oﬃcial GDP 
at factor cost, but the former has a steeper downward trend. The average 
monthly output using the economic approach is $57.7 million, compared 
to the oﬃcial total cost approach of $19.4 million. We also observe in ﬁ  gure 
10.6 that the utility-  based output measure is more volatile than the factor 
cost measure. This is due to the rollover of the prize money when there is 
no jackpot winner for a particular draw. These rollovers create occasional 
Fig. 10.4  Sales and expected values of Lotto 6/  49Measuring the Output and Prices of the Lottery Sector    4 2 1
excitement and eﬀectively reduce the unfairness for the next draw. The eﬀects 
are reﬂ  ected in the utility measure of the game.17
17. This rollover eﬀect creates substantial volatility in both the price and quantity of the 
ﬁ  nal demand consumption of lottery output, and hence, statistical agencies may be reluctant 
to adopt this approach to measuring the price of lottery services in their CPIs. This problem 
could be solved by smoothing the raw data. This type of smoothing would automatically occur 
if statistical agencies adopted a rolling- year methodology for their CPIs; see Diewert (1998) for 
an explanation of this methodology.
Fig. 10.5  Price index of Lotto 6/  49
Fig. 10.6  Output of Lotto 6/  49422    Kam Yu
We also estimate the elasticity of demand for the lottery using a simple 
log- linear  model:
log Q   log P   log y   T,
where T is a trend variable, which is included to capture change in taste over 
time. The resulting price elasticity of demand is –  0.672, with a standard 
error of 0.017. This result is comparable to the values of – 0.66 estimated by 
Forrest, Gulley, and Simmons (2000), who use a two-  stage ordinary least 
squares estimation, with the diﬀerence between the ticket price and the 
expected value as the eﬀective price of lottery. Using a similar approach, 
Gulley and Scott (1993) estimated the price elasticities of four state- operated 
lottos in the United States, with results ranging from –  0.40 to –  2.5. Farrell 
and Walker (1999) used cross-  sectional data to study the demand for lot-
teries in the United Kingdom using the Heckman selection model. Their 
estimated price elasticity was – 0.763. Also, Beenstock and Haitovsky (2001) 
studied the demand for lotto in Israel using time-  series data, with the esti-
mated long-  run price elasticity equal to –  0.65. It is surprising that these 
results, although diﬀering in methods, nature of data, and countries, show 
very close estimates of price elasticities of demand.
10.5    Conclusion
The classical expected utility hypothesis fails to capture a consumer’s 
risk-  averse behavior in facing big losses with small probabilities and the 
risk- loving behavior involving large gains with small probabilities. New non-
expected utility theories have been developed to overcome that diﬃculty. In 
this chapter, we have applied implicit expected utility theory to the prob-
lem of measuring outputs of lotteries. The results show that output levels 
of Lotto 6/  49 in Canada is almost three times higher than the oﬃcial sta-
tistics, which uses the total cost of providing the service approach as the 
output measurement principle. This kind of direct economic approach is 
recommended by the System of National Accounts, 1993 (Inter-  Secretariat 
Working Group on National Accounts 1993) for government and nonproﬁ  t 
organization output measurement. The approach taken here is the ex ante 
welfare measure of the consumers facing risk and uncertainty. The method 
developed can potentially be applied to other games of chance.18 The esti-
mated price elasticity of demand for lottery in Canada is close to that of the 
United Kingdom and Israel in previous studies.
18. See Dubins and Savage (1965) and R. Epstein (1977) for the mathematical analysis of a 
whole variety of games.Measuring the Output and Prices of the Lottery Sector    4 2 3
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Comment  Alan G. White
Overview: Methods, Data, and Results
In chapter 10 of this volume, Kam Yu presents an economic approach to 
measuring the output and prices of a hard-  to-  measure sector—that of the 
lottery sector. Yu applies implicit expected utility theory by developing a 
money metric of utility of playing the Canadian Lotto 6/  49 game.
Yu argues that the lottery is becoming an increasingly important compo-
nent of gross domestic product (GDP) in Canada. He notes that according 
to the 1997 Survey of Household Spending (SHS), over two- thirds of fami-
lies in Canada purchased lottery tickets, and average expenditure on lottery 
tickets was approximately $238. Given that expenditure on gambling is likely 
underreported in the SHS, the lottery industry may be a more important 
and signiﬁ  cant component of GDP than currently measured, necessitating 
a more accurate method for measuring its output.
In the theory of consumption under uncertainty, a risk-  averse consumer 
maximizes an expected utility function in which risk averseness is often 
assumed to be decreasing in wealth. Although this theory has been applied 
to problems in insurance and investment decisions, it predicts that a risk-
  averse expected utility maximizer would never purchase a lottery ticket 
unless the payout is extremely large. This, however, is not consistent with 
reality, where the purchase of lottery tickets and gambling among consum-
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